

“Why Nations Fight?": An Analysis of the Causes of the Russian Federation-Ukraine War from Russian Perspective within the Framework of Richard Ned Lebow's Approach

“Devletler Neden Savaşı?": Richard Ned Lebow'un Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde Rusya Federasyonu-Ukrayna Savaşı Sebeplerinin Rus Bakış Açısından Analizi

Murat JANE*

Hazar JANE**

* Assist Prof., Istanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye
e-mail: muratjane@aydin.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-2409-131X

** Assist Prof., Istanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye
e-mail: hazarjane@aydin.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0001-9584-3999

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
29.05.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
04.12.2024

Abstract

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation (RF) on March 18, 2014, and the declaration of the People's Republics in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine are considered by many international relations experts as one of the most important developments of the post-Cold War era. In this respect, the ongoing RF-Ukraine War, which started on February 20, 2022, after the developments in 2014, can be interpreted as a reflection of the power struggle between the RF-West (Euro-Atlantic Alliance) rather than RF-Ukraine relations in the period from the Post-Cold War Period to 2022. There are many reasons for the RF-Ukraine War, especially the tension in RF-West relations. Richard Ned Lebow's perspectives on the nature and causes of the war make it possible to address the causes of this war holistically. Therefore, the study aims to understand why the RF wants to go to war with Ukraine within the framework of Lebow's approach. The study will utilize the process analysis method in this framework through primary and secondary sources.

Keywords: Russian Federation, Ukraine, Richard Ned Lebow, War, Post-Soviet

Öz

Rusya Federasyonu (RF)'nin 18 Mart 2014 tarihinde Kırım'ı ilhakı ve Ukrayna'nın doğusunda yer alan Donetsk ve Luhansk'ta halk cumhuriyetlerinin ilan edilmesi pek çok uluslararası ilişkiler uzmanına göre Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin en önemli gelişmelerinden biri olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu açıdan 2014'teki gelişmelerden sonra 20 Şubat 2022'de başlayan ve halen devam eden RF-Ukrayna Savaşı, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem'den 2022 yılına kadar geçen süreçte RF-Ukrayna ilişkilerinden ziyade RF-Batı (Avro-Atlantik İttifak) arasındaki güç mücadelesinin yansımaları olarak yorumlanabilir.

RF-Batı ilişkilerindeki gerilim başta olmak üzere RF-Ukrayna Savaşı'nın pek çok nedeni bulunmaktadır. Richard Ned Lebow'un savaşın doğasına ve nedenlerine ilişkin bakış açıları, söz konusu savaşın nedenlerine bütüncül olarak ele almayı olanaklı hale getirmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, Lebow'un yaklaşımı çerçevesinde RF'nin neden Ukrayna ile savaşmak istediğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışmada birincil ve ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden süreç analizi yöntemi kullanılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya Federasyonu, Ukrayna, Richard Ned Lebow, Savaş, Post-Sovyet

Introduction

War is undoubtedly one of the oldest realities of human history. Political units established in history have fought each other for different reasons and motivations. For example, at first glance, World War I began after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austria-Hungarian Empire by Serbian nationalist Gavrillo Princip. This development was the apparent cause. However, when we look at the pre-war developments, there were many underlying causes ranging from the struggle for dominant power status between Germany and the United Kingdom to the policies of Wilhelm II, from imperialism to the breakdown of the Concert of Europe.¹ For example, although the Falklands War initially broke out for territorial reasons, the underlying reason was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s desire to strengthen her country’s status in the international system.² In another example, the hegemonic power United States of America (USA) intervened in Afghanistan and invaded Iraq to fight against global terrorism as justification in the post-Cold War era.

As can be understood from the above examples, there are many reasons for wars, from honor to national interest, from the influence of leaders and decision-makers to normative values. The RF-Ukraine War, initiated by the RF with the rhetoric of “special operation”, also embodied many reasons that fall within the scope of history, sociology, psychology, and international politics beyond current developments. The RF-Ukraine War, including different and intricate dynamics, is thought to be better understood by academics via an inclusive perspective on the causes of the war, such as the perspective of theorist/historian Richard Ned Lebow.

In this framework, this study argues that it is insufficient to analyze the RF-Ukraine War only through current developments because war has sociological, historical, and psychological dimensions, as well as geopolitical ones. Lebow’s perspective includes a holistic approach that can explain why the RF attacked Ukraine.

1. General Approaches to Causes of Wars

War, one of the four basic foreign policy tools in international relations,³ is as old as human history. As diplomatic historian Oral Sander emphasizes, 87% of the 7000-year known human history has been spent in war.⁴ It is difficult to reduce war to a single definition because there is no general definition of war, even in international law documents. However, in the international law doctrine, scholars have tried to define war with its two elements: objective and subjective. This means that the armed conflicts in question must have taken place between two states, and at least one of the parties must have committed the act of armed conflict to wage war.⁵ Expressing the objective and subjective elements of war, Hüseyin Pazarıcı defined war as “an armed struggle between two or more states against each other in order to impose their will”.⁶ In addition to international law, Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz described war as an extended version of a duel. According to Clausewitz, the primary purpose of this “extended duel” is to defeat the enemy and then bring it to a point

1 Barış Özdal, “1. Dünya Savaşı’nın Diplomasinin Gelişimine Etkileri”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-2*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 2020, pp. 7-12.

2 İbrahim Çağrı Erkul, *Birleşik Krallık Dış Politikası 1979-2020*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya, 2021, pp. 15-21; İbrahim Çağrı Erkul, *Commonwealth’i Anlamak: Beşikten Mezara Britanya İmparatorluğu*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya, 2021, pp. 277-280.

3 Barış Özdal, “Diplomasi”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-1*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 2022, p. 27.

4 Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara, 2009, p. 594.

5 Hüseyin Pazarıcı, *Uluslararası Hukuk*, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2004, p. 530.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 441.

where it cannot resist.⁷ Clausewitz does not separate this purpose and approach from politics and argues that war continues with politics through other means. In this context, he regards war as a political action.⁸

As there is no general definition of war on which many agree, there is also no clear consensus on the causes of war. The lack of consensus lies in the abundance of answers to why war broke out. This situation has brought about the formation of different theories/approaches regarding the origins of war.⁹ In other words, there is no grand theory regarding the causes of war. There is undoubtedly a need for a good classification to understand the theories and approaches to causes of war better. In this respect, the causes of war can be classified at the levels of individual, state, and international system within the framework of the discipline of International Relations.¹⁰

When focused on the causes of war at the individual level, it is possible to see the presupposition of evil human nature, which is one of Realism's main reference points. Among the foremost thinkers defending this point of view is Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes, man seeks to increase his power to survive in the state of nature. Hobbes claimed that human beings constantly compete for honor and reputation, that the ongoing power struggle over honor and reputation will ultimately lead to jealousy and hatred, and that war occurs due to jealousy and hatred.¹¹ Classical Realist theorist Hans Morgenthau also saw international relations from a Hobbesian perspective and claimed that international politics consisted of power struggles like all forms of politics. In other words, the act of power has always been the primary purpose of politics. Morgenthau defined power as control over competitors' and interlocutors' thoughts and practical policies. According to Morgenthau, although power is a concept that is too comprehensive to be reduced to types of violence, such as war, the phenomenon of war is one of the intrinsic elements of politics, like other types of violence (arrest, imprisonment, death penalty, etc.).¹² Morgenthau's claim that all social forces, including the state, are products of human nature,¹³ shows that war is also a part of human nature.

Sigmund Freud also claims that the cause of war is the tension between Eros (Life Principle) and Thanatos (Death). According to Freud, the formation of human associations, such as nations, is the result of civilization, and Eros is the power that binds individual people to larger units. However, the instinct of aggression inherent in man stands against civilization. This tension is at the center of the war, the battle for life.¹⁴ Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of the thinkers who claimed that individuals' reasons cause war but that individuals should not be entirely blamed for this. Unlike Freud and Hobbes, Rousseau argues that human nature is good. The factor that destroys the good nature of man is society. According to Rousseau,

7 Carl Von Clausewitz, *Savaş Üzerine* (Çev. Selma Koçak), Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2011, p. 29.

8 Ibid, pp. 45-46.

9 Öner Akgül, "Bilimsel Yöntemlerle Savaşın Nedenlerini Açıklama Yolu Olarak Savaş Çalışmaları Disiplini", *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, 12:23, 2016, p. 2.

10 The classification in question is inspired by Kenneth Waltz's point of view. For detailed information, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001.

11 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan veya Bir Din ve Dünya Devletinin İçeriği, Biçimi ve Kudreti* (Çev. Semih Lim), Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 129.

12 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948, p. 13.

13 Ibid., p. 4.

14 Sigmund Freud, *Bir Yanılsamanın Geleceği: Uygarlık ve Hoşnutsuzlukları* (Çev. Aziz Yardımlı), İdea Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 103-104.

people who are corrupted by society –whose nature is damaged– are prone to violence. The basis of violence lies in the inequality that occurred after the transition to a civilized society. The state, the political unit created by humans whose nature has been distorted by inequality, has also become prone to war. In this context, violence in the state of nature has become organized by the state.¹⁵

In addition to the assumption of human nature, issues such as leaders’ prejudices, emotional conditions, and hormonal imbalances are also among the causes of war.¹⁶ In foreign policy analysis, decisions taken by leaders, including declarations of war, are evaluated through operational code analysis and leadership trait analysis. Broadly speaking, operational code analysis examines the leader’s beliefs about the potential of their power and the beliefs underlying any foreign policy decision they make, including war.¹⁷ Operational code analysis, first examined in Nathan Leites’ works titled *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953),¹⁸ was redefined and structured by Alexander George, who formed propositions regarding the nature of conflicts.¹⁹ According to George, the operational code refers to the worldview (*Weltanschauung*), cognitive map, and political culture of the elite, which is basically the actor’s belief system about political life.²⁰ Like George, Margaret Hermann also analyzed the foreign policy decision-making process through the leader’s behavior and revealed the criteria determining the leader’s decision-making. These criteria are belief in the ability to control events, seeking power and influence, self-confidence, conceptual complexity, task focus orientation, in-group bias, and distrust of others.²¹

In addition to the individual level, it is also possible to run across approaches that view the causes of war as state-oriented. For example, according to Jeremy Black, there is a direct and reciprocal relationship between war and the establishment of the state. In light of this symbiotic relationship, the war-state relationship has gained momentum since the 19th century, when the monopoly of violence passed from pirates and mercenaries to the state.²² Moreover, practices involving coercion, such as strengthening the state apparatus, state’s tax capacity, increasing its income source, and compulsory military service, are among the examples of the linear relationship between the state and war. The claims in question were put forward by theorists such as Max Weber, Charles Tilly, and Michael Mann.²³ For example, according to Tilly, both the nation-state and the international system are formed by war. In

15 Faruk Yalvaç, “Rousseau’nun Savaş ve Barış Kuramı: Adalet Olarak Barış”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 14:4, 2007, pp. 138-139.

16 Iain Hardie, Dominic Johnson, and Dominic Tierney, “Psychological Aspects of War”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2011, p. 72.

17 Valerie M. Hudson and Benjamin S. Day, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2020, p. 21.

18 Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of Politburo*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1951; Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.

19 Hazar Vural Jane, Velayeti Fakih ve İran Dış Politikası: Ali Hamaney’in Konumu, Doktora Tezi, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2019, s. 64.

20 Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 13:2, 1969, p. 197.

21 Margaret Hermann, “Assesing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis”, Jerrold Post (ed.), *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2003, p. 204.

22 Jeremy Black, *Savaş ve Dünya: Askeri Güç ve Dünyanın kaderi 1945-2000*, (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2009, pp. 347-349.

23 Hakan Şahin, “Tarihsel Süreçte Savaşların Devletin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümündeki Rolü”, *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 24, 2016, pp. 87-90.

addition, the nation-state is the political unit that responds most successfully to war compared to other political units in history. Tilly claimed that the unity of capital and power was the expansion of the nation-state; in other words, the formation process of the nation-state was at the center of wars.²⁴ Michael Mann also revealed a linear relationship between state, war, and capitalism and approached militarism as an institution that makes war seem normal.²⁵

The third level regarding the causes of wars is the structure of the international system. The most prominent theorist who emphasizes the relationship between the international system and war is Kenneth Waltz, the founder of Neo-Realism. Waltz put forward that the anarchic nature of the international system lies at the basis of conflicts.²⁶ Power transition theorists also see the dissatisfaction of a rising power in the international system with present conditions as the cause of wars. In parallel with this situation, a rising power in question declares war against a hegemonic power to accelerate the power transition in the international system and reshape the system economically, politically, and legally according to its expectations.²⁷ For example, according to Robert Gilpin, the hegemonic power struggle begins when a current hegemon cannot ensure the continuity of the system with present resources. The hegemonic power struggle constitutes the beginning of a new hegemonic cycle. This process continues until the power distribution is reorganized. The end of a hegemonic war marks the beginning of a new cycle of development, expansion, and decline.²⁸ According to George Modelski, the international system has been shaped by the influence of a hegemonic power in 100-year cycles since the 15th century. Modelski conceptualized this power as the “dominant power” of which criteria is controlling long-distance trade routes.²⁹ Some views, which place principles of liberalism and liberal economics at the center of the international system, explain the causes of wars by the deterioration of the liberal structure of the international system. For example, according to Charles Kindleberger, advocating hegemonic stability theory, there is always a need for a hegemonic power to maintain a liberal economy.³⁰ According to Capitalist Peace Theory, the stagnation of the economy and the disappearance of economy-based liberal interdependence make decision-makers prone to wage war.³¹ John Herz is one of the theorists analyzing the origins of war in the anarchic structure of the international system. According to Herz, since the international system is anarchic, states seek to increase their military capacities so as not to be attacked, completely destroyed, and under the sovereignty of another state. An increase in the capacity of the state in question is perceived as a threat by other states, and these states, in turn, also seek to increase their capacities. This vicious cycle of capacity building to ensure security makes the structure of the international system even more insecure. This vicious circle is called a “security dilemma”.³²

In addition to liberal and realist views seeing the causes of war in the structure of the international system, there are also critical approaches to the subject. For example, according

24 Burcu Kaleoğlu, “Charles Tilly: Ulus Devletin Oluşumu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 2018, p. 134.

25 Aslı Akçayöz ve İrem Şengül, “Michael Mann: İktidarın Çokluğu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 2018, pp. 193-194.

26 Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, pp. 237-238.

27 Jack S. Levy, “Theories and causes of war”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2011, p. 18.

28 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981, p. 210

29 Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918’e*, 2003, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003, p. 96.

30 Robert Gilpin, *Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politikası* (Çev. Murat Duran, Selçuk Oktay, M. Kadir Ceyhan and Gürkan Polat), Kripto Basım-Yayın, Ankara, 2005, p. 105.

31 Levy, *Theories and causes of war*, p. 25.

32 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, 2:2, 1950, p. 157.

to Marxism, the cause of wars is class struggle. Karl Marx argued that war is nothing but the expression of a certain division of labor in the organization of nations and international relations. In this framework, war is a form of violent conflict between differentiated political communities.³³ In parallel with these views, Lenin argues that war is a consequence of imperialism, whereas Bukharin interprets war as a power struggle between the owners of capital.³⁴ Another critical approach to the causes of war is the feminist approach. According to feminism, war is a phenomenon shaped by patriarchy, militarism, white supremacy, and capitalism.³⁵ In this context, the idea that war is a natural phenomenon is also a product of the masculine perspective, and the feminists criticize the fact that war is a phenomenon decided by men.³⁶

In addition to realist, liberal, and critical approaches, there is also a normative approach to the causes of war. The type of wars categorized under “Just War” includes different ideologies and perspectives. In general and in the abstract, just war involves placing the phenomenon of war on a legitimized basis. The Just War Theory has two dimensions: *Jus ad bellum* (justification) and *jus in bello* (the way, norms, and tools of waging war). According to Walzer, as the idea regarding the legitimacy of war develops, the tendency to go beyond the rules of war increases.³⁷ The first one is expressed with an adjective (“just”/“unjust”), and the second one is expressed with an adverb (“fairly”/“unfairly”).³⁸ Therefore, the starting point of a just war in terms of *jus ad bellum* changes. For example, while just war theory was developed based on Christianity in Medieval Europe,³⁹ according to Hindu tradition, war under dharma and divine law (treating civilians and wounded well, not using inhumane weapons, not attacking those who retreat, etc.) is considered just.⁴⁰ According to Marxism, a just war is internationalist, and a war aimed at saving people living in different states and being oppressed is just. In the final analysis, the goal is to end exploitation-based wars caused by capitalism.⁴¹ In another example, the post-September 11 “war on terror” discourse was included within the scope of a just war. As the most powerful state of the international system, the USA was attacked on its territory by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, and then it stated that the attack in question was not only against the USA but also against democracy.⁴² Thus, a “just war” was launched against terrorism by bending the rules of international law.⁴³ Just War is also included in the United Nations (UN) system. Article 51 of the UN Charter

33 Benno Teschke, “War and International Relations”, Marcello Musto (ed.), *The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, p. 302.

34 Faruk Yalvaç, “Savaş ve Barış”, Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Devlet ve Otesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, p. 279.

35 Megan MacKenzie ve Nicole Wegner, “Introduction to Feminist Solutions for Ending War”, Megan MacKenzie and Nicole Wegner (eds.), *Feminist Solutions for Ending War*, Pluto Press, London, 2021, p. 1

36 Rebecca Grant, “The Quagmire of Gender and International Security”, V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 1992, p. 83 quoted in Özlem Tür and Çiğdem Aydın Koyuncu, “Feminist Uluslararası İlişkiler Yaklaşımı: Temelleri, Gelişimi, Katkı ve Sorunları”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 7:26, 2010, p. 13.

37 Michael Walzer, *Haklı Savaş Haksız Savaş: Tarihten Örneklerle Desteklenmiş Ahlakî bir Tez* (Çev. Mehmet Doğan), Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, pp. xi-xii.

38 Ibid, s. 46.

39 Fulya Aksu Ereker, “Haklı Savaş”, *Güvenlik Yazıları*, Ekim 2019, https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HakliSavas_FulyaAksuEreker_v.1.pdf, accessed 24. 02. 2024, p. 4

40 Surya P. Sudebi, “The Concept in Hinduism of Just War”, *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, 8:2, 2003 quoted in Alan Stephens ve Nicola Baker, *Savaşın Anlamak: 21. Yüzyıl için Strateji* (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2009, p. 268.

41 Darrel Moellendorf, “Marxism, Internationalism and the Justice of War”, *Science & Society*, 58:3, 1994, p. 264.

42 Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz, “Westphalia’dan Günümüze Savaş”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 2007, p. 29.

43 Richard Falk, “War and Peace in and Age of Terror and State Terrorism”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 2007, pp. 2-4.

contains the general scope of just war within this system. However, states can use their self-defense rights until the UN Security Council takes the necessary measures.⁴⁴

As seen from the examples above, although there are similarities between perspectives on why wars occur, there are no commonalities. However, it can be argued that all these reasons affect war phenomenon from different perspectives.

2. “Why Nations Fight?” according to Richard Ned Lebow

As mentioned in the previous section, there are many different approaches to the causes of war at individual, state, and international levels. Making a hierarchy of importance among the causes of war has often induced some causes to be ignored. For example, explaining the causes of war solely in terms of the anarchic structure of the international system may lead to neglect of the inner world of individuals and the unique historicity of states. Lebow’s perspective aims to melt the different causes of the war into a single pot. Lebow demonstrates his commitment to developing an inclusive theory in international relations by dedicating his book titled *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* to “all those who transgress disciplinary boundaries and recognize the need to embed our understanding of international relations in a wider cultural and historical context”.⁴⁵ In this framework, emphasizing four basic reasons and motives as to why states go to war to cover fields of interest of different disciplines, Lebow claims six basic arguments about the causes of war. According to Lebow, the reasons why states go to war are fear, interest, standing, and revenge, among which the last two are particularly decisive.⁴⁶ He argues that in addition to these four reasons, there are also four basic motives driving states to war. These four motives are appetite, spirit, reason, and fear, which Lebow identifies by drawing on the ideas of Aristotle and Ancient Greek thinkers.⁴⁷ He demonstrates the relationship between the general causes of war and the motives leading to war in the following table:⁴⁸

Table 1: Relationship between Motives/Emotions, Goals, and Instruments:

Motive/Emotion	Goal	Instrument
Appetite	Satiation	Wealth
Spirit	Esteem	Honor/Standing
Fear	Security	Power

As stated before, Lebow aims to create a comprehensive theory in International Relations. In this framework, he emphasizes spirit more than other motives causing war.⁴⁹ In parallel with this, he states that most theorists neglect honor and standing as instruments of spirit as the main causes of war.⁵⁰ In this respect, Lebow claims to have developed a political paradigm based on –and attempts to explain– the spirit and applies it to International

44 Mehmet Gönlübol, *Milletlerarası Siyasi Teşkilatlanma*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1975, p. 364.

45 Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2010.

46 Richard Ned Lebow, *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

47 James Der Derian criticizes Lebow for basing his ideas too much on Ancient Greece. Lebow defends himself by stating that he prefers Ancient Greek thought because it analytically explains not only Ancient Greece but also the non-Greek world and contains essential approaches for international relations discipline. For detailed information, see Richard Ned Lebow, “Motives, evidence, identity: Engaging my critics”, *International Theory*, 2:3, 2010, p. 487, and Lebow, *Why Nations Fight?*, p. 65.

48 Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 90.

49 *Ibid.*, s. 505.

50 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Causes of War: A Reply to My Critics”, *Security Studies*, 21:2, 2012, p. 362.

Relations.⁵¹ In this framework, spirit-based causes of war are more prominent for Lebow than other causes.

The spirit-based perspective assumes that people individually and collectively seek self-esteem. Individuals want to feel good about themselves and have their self-esteem accepted by society. In other words, self-esteem not being approved by society is not meaningful.⁵² In this framework, the purpose of spirit is to gain self-respect, and the means for this is honor. Honor is divided into two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic honor. Intrinsic honor is related to one’s behavior and values.⁵³ Extrinsic honor includes behaviors that are accepted/approved through the respect of others.⁵⁴ As seen in the table above, honor, status, and standing are interwoven in Lebow’s approach.

Standing, honor, and status, which are linked to spirit, are culturally constructed phenomena as much as they are related to military power. National identity, linked to culture, is formed when a state and its citizens assert their distinctiveness from others. National identities, which form the psychological foundations of nationalism, build self-esteem.⁵⁵ As one of the main outputs of the individual or collective self and a product of political and social processes, national identity can also be formed as a result of competing discourses.⁵⁶

Lebow sees the international system as a hybrid structure in which spirit, appetite, reason, and fear coexist. He argues that balance in the international system is destabilized when reason fails to balance spirit and appetite.⁵⁷ When reason fails to balance appetite (satiation, wealth, and conquest-based politics) and spirit, fear motive emerges.⁵⁸ While spirit-driven societies conduct their conflicts for limited purposes, fear-based societies cannot limit themselves due to their confrontational characteristics. In this respect, fear-based societies are more likely to be caught in the “lobster trap” (a situation that is easy to get into and difficult to get out of).⁵⁹

In light of the abovementioned evaluations, Lebow puts forward six basic arguments about the causes of the war:⁶⁰

- The most aggressive states are rising powers aiming for great power status and dominant great powers wanting to become hegemons.
- Rising powers and dominant powers rarely fight each other.
- The preferred targets of dominant⁶¹ and rising powers⁶² are declining great powers or weaker third parties. They also target powers that are temporarily weak⁶³ and allied with other major powers.

51 Richard Ned Lebow, “Fear, interest and honour: Outlines of a theory of International Relations”, *International Affairs*, 82:3, 2006, p. 431.

52 Lebow, *Why Nations Fight?*, p. 66.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 72.

55 Richard Ned Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 3.

56 Richard Ned Lebow, “Identity and International Relations”, *International Relations*, 22:4, 2008, p. 474.

57 Lebow, *Fear, interest and honour*, pp. 446-447.

58 Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, p. 505.

59 Ibid., p. 92.

60 Lebow, *Why Nations Fight?*, pp. 91-96.

61 Dominant power is the actor more powerful than other major powers in the international system. Ibid., p. 99.

62 Rising powers are the actors aiming to achieve great power status and are recognized as such by the great powers of their time. Ibid., p. 101.

63 Weak powers are actors defined as militarily weak and can be easily defeated by dominant, rising, and great powers. Ibid. p. 103.

- Almost all so-called hegemonic wars result from accidental and unexpected escalation.
- The unexpected escalation and uncalculated balance of power have deeper causes than imperfect data.
- Weak and declining powers often start wars against great powers. Looking for revenge⁶⁴ and honor has an impact on this.

Lebow explains why states fight, the motivations leading to war, and basic assumptions about war, and then he classifies the causes of war in two ways. While the first relates to the long-term history of war and tension –its historical and sociological dimensions– the second relates to recent crises and developments.⁶⁵ This classification can also explain why the RF wants to fight with Ukraine.

3. “Why Russia fights” Ukraine?

As stated above, according to Lebow, states fight each other due to a multi-dynamic process at the intersection of motives, goals, and means. In addition, Lebow classifies the causes of war in two ways: underlying and direct causes. At first glance, it is possible to state that the RF began to fight Ukraine due to the developments occurring between 2014 and 2022. However, limiting the RF’s attacks on Ukraine to developments in these eight years may be quite superficial. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the historical and sociological dimensions of the war. It is also necessary to focus on Lebow’s classification as underlying and direct causes of the war.

The underlying causes are related to the historical and sociological roots of the war, as mentioned before. The historical roots of the war are related to how the Russians view Ukraine and Ukrainianness. For the Russians, Ukraine is an integral part of Russian history –especially of Eastern Slavism– together with Belarus.⁶⁶ Thus, Ukraine is referred to as “Little Russia” in Russian historiography.⁶⁷ The first republics that formed the USSR were the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belarusian SSR.⁶⁸ In other words, according to the RF, the historical Russian territories must be together under the leadership of the RF. In this context, for Russian decision-makers and political elites, Ukraine’s becoming an independent state is considered a “weird joke of history”.⁶⁹ This approach was defended not only by the Russian nationalists but also by Russian liberal Boris Nemtsov and opposition politician Alexei Navalny, who was recently found dead in his cell.

64 Lebow mentions revenge in the context of regaining lost territory first. *Ibid.*, p. 14. However, operations launched by the USA after the September 11 Attacks were designed to restore reputation and position in the international system rather than to regain lost territories. In this respect, revenge was used to restore the self-esteem and status of the USA.

65 Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1981, p. 1.

66 Taras Kuzio, “Ukrainian versus Pan-Russian Identities: The Roots of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 2024, p. 3.

67 For detailed information, see Murat Jane, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güvenlik Strateji Belgeleri Bağlamında Kırım İlhakı’nın Tarihsel-Sembolik ve Askeri-Jeopolitik Analizi”, *International Journal of Social Inquiry*, 15:2, December 2022, pp. 418-419.

68 Daria Khlevnyuk, “The Russian “Old Left,” Conspiracies around the USSR’s Demise, and the Russo–Ukrainian War”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 4 August 2023, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD299.pdf>, accessed 01. 05. 2024, p. 16

69 Contrary to these views, Ukrainian nationalist elites claim that Ukraine had an ancient history of approximately 1000 years before Russian rule. In this narrative, Ukraine is part of European civilization, not historical Russia. Georgiy V. Kasanov, “Russia and Ukraine: Forever Apart? Two Countries at Loggerheads over ‘Common Past’”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 16:3, July–September, 2018, pp. 174-175.

Both politicians stated that they saw no difference between Russians and Ukrainians.⁷⁰ In his speech titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, RF President Vladimir Putin emphasized that Russians and Ukrainians share a common historical and spiritual space. According to Putin, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constitute ancient Russia. In short, the three people cannot be separated from each other. Among the arguments Putin uses when evaluating Ukraine as united with Russia is that the word Ukraine derives from the old Russian word “*okrania*” meaning periphery, and that word “Ukrainian” is the name of the security forces protecting the external borders.⁷¹ Parallel to Putin’s views, according to Kuzio, the Russian attacks in 2014 and 2022 are the result of the struggle between the idea of Ukrainianness and Pan-Russian identity, which regards Ukraine as part of the Russian world.⁷²

According to Lebow’s classification, direct causes are undoubtedly expansionist policies of the Euro-Atlantic alliance towards the near abroad of the RF.⁷³ There are historical reasons behind the RF’s perception of threats from Euro-Atlantic expansion. Therefore, anti-Westernism lies in the foundations of Russian strategic culture.⁷⁴ One of the most concrete indicators of this is that there are, in Russian historiography, two patriotic wars fought against two Western actors (Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany). Since NATO is regarded as a Western actor that expanded against Russia during the Cold War and its aftermath,⁷⁵ The Russians aimed to ensure their security against the West by establishing buffer zones around them (mainly in Eastern Europe).⁷⁶

The eastward expansion of the Euro-Atlantic alliance is a geopolitical problem for the RF, but the Russians perceive the West as a threat not only geopolitically but also culturally. According to Slavophiles and Eurasianists positioning Russians outside the West, Western civilization has a corrosive effect on Russian values and culture. While pro-Western policies were pursued in the early years of the RF, the Eurasianist and traditional discourse has become more dominant in Russian foreign policy after eastward enlargements of NATO and the EU.⁷⁷ The US-led Euro-Atlantic alliance’s attempt to transform non-Western states according to liberal values was met with a backlash from the actors critical of US hegemony, such as the RF. The two tools for the spread of the liberal civilizational model were colorful revolutions and military power.⁷⁸ Colorful revolutions were especially effective in the process leading

70 For detailed information, see Jane, *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güvenlik Stratejileri*, p. 420.

71 Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>, accessed 30. 04. 2024

72 Kuzio, *Ukrainian versus Pan-Russian Identities*, p. 1.

73 For example, the RF National Security Concept published in 1997 and 2000 accepts NATO’s eastern expansion as a threat. According to Sapmaz, the basis of the security documents announced in 2000 is NATO’s declaration of the “out of area” concept related to its intervention in Kosovo and the approval of post-Soviet states Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO. For detailed information, see Murat Jane, *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Trans-Kafkasya Politikasının Analizi: Süreklilik mi Dönüşüm mü?*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa, 2020, pp. 233-235; Ahmet Sapmaz, *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Askeri Güvenlik Refleksindeki Dönüşüm: Askeri Doktrinler, Askeri Müdahaleler, Nedenler*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2018, p. 101. The RF’s post-2000 security documents also include its threat perceptions regarding the geopolitical and normative expansion of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

74 Elias Götz and Jorgen Staun, “Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 43:3, 2022, p. 482. In addition to this view, according to Sezgin Kaya, for Russians, the West is not only an interlocutor but also a target to belong to, be captured, and be overcome. With this feature, the West is positioned as “*constitutive outside*” or “*other*” in terms of Russian identity. Sezgin Kaya, *Rus Dış Politikasında Batı*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa, 2011, p. 251

75 Götz and Staun, *Why Russia attacked Ukraine*, p. 484.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 482.

77 Kaya, *Rus Dış Politikasında Batı*, pp. 254-256.

78 Zhao Huasheng, “The Pendulum of History: Thirty Years after the Soviet Union”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:1, January-March, 2022, p. 24.

to the RF's attack against Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea and the war in 2022 are the results of a colorful revolution in Ukraine. Therefore, these two developments are not only geopolitical-based but also civilization-based for the RF. According to the RF, the success of the "special operation"⁷⁹ against Ukraine will attract states in its near abroad to the Eurasian Economic Union. Moreover, this will increase the prestige of the RF.⁸⁰

According to Lebow, the status of actors in the international system directly relates to their tendency to impose their esteem on other actors. The efforts of the RF to assert its status began after the end of the Cold War and have been frequently emphasized, especially by Putin. The collapse of the USSR significantly impacted the RF's loss of status and its search for its aftermath. The collapse of the USSR should not be reduced to the collapse of any state because it was an ideological state and economic system.⁸¹ Russians established many political entities throughout history, such as Muscovite Russia, Russian Tsardom, and the RF; however, they claim to be a global power for the first time with the USSR. Therefore, the dissolution of the USSR led the Russians to define their identity and their status in the international system. This is where the "great power status", one of the components of Russian strategic culture, comes into play. According to the Russian perspective, a few great powers should lead the world, and these great powers should have their own spheres of influence. Near abroad doctrine and the Eurasian Union project include policies parallel with this perspective and discourse.⁸² According to Barry Buzan, the Russians have been trying to achieve great power status since the 19th century, but their ability to maintain it has remained limited.⁸³ For example, the Russian Tsardom was one of the five great states of the European Harmony but became disappointed after the Crimean War. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians embraced Marxism, the "rebel child" of Western civilization, and being so, could not easily assert itself and its status. From the late USSR to the mid-1990s, Russia took rapid liberalization steps; however, it could not get the Euro-Atlantic Alliance to accept its concerns about NATO expansion and its need to be respected in its immediate neighborhood.⁸⁴ Ukraine's current situation is at the intersection of the security challenge the West poses and the RF's goal of achieving great power status. In this framework, not only Ukraine's membership to NATO but also Ukraine's cooperation with NATO without being a member is perceived as a threat by RF. This is because, as Götz and Staun underline, Ukraine's orientation towards the West hinders not only RF's security interests but also its perception of itself as a great power.⁸⁵ From Lebow's point of view, the loss of Ukraine negatively affects the RF's esteem, hence its standing, honor, status, and spirit as a motive.

In the post-Cold War period, facts and developments making Ukraine crucial for the RF's security and status in the international system can be summarized as follows:

79 The RF described the war with Ukraine as a "special operation" until March 22, 2024. On that date, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the RF had launched a special operation against Ukraine; however, after the West supported Ukraine, the process turned into a de facto war. See "Rusya'dan bir ilk: Ukrayna'daki operasyon "savaş" olarak tanımlandı", <https://www.haberturk.com/rusya-ukrayna-daki-ozel-askeri-operasyon-icin-ilk-defa-savas-kelimesini-kullandi-3671583>, accessed 19. 05. 2024.

80 Vyacheslav V. Sutyurin, "Special Military Operation in Ukraine: Consequences for the EAEU and Eurasian Integration", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20: 2, April-June, 2022, p. 160.

81 Huasheng, *The Pendulum of History*, p. 12.

82 Götz and Staun, *Why Russia attacked Ukraine*, pp. 485-486.

83 Barry Buzan, "Russia in the Post-Cold War International Order", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 19:4, October-December, 2021, p. 22.

84 Richard Sakwa, "Crisis of the International System and International Politics", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 21:1, January-March, 2023, p. 77.

85 Götz and Staun, *Why Russia attacked Ukraine*, pp. 486-491.

- The presence of USSR-era nuclear weapons in newly independent post-Soviet states, including Ukraine.⁸⁶
- The significance of Crimea, a Ukrainian territory in the post-Cold War period, for both Orthodox Christianity and Russian history and the identification of possessing Crimea with great power status.⁸⁷
- Cultural reforms in Ukraine that are contrary to RF’s interests, such as the closure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the banning of pro-Russian opposition parties, and the decline of the Russian language in Ukraine.⁸⁸

As seen from the developments and examples above, and in light of Lebow’s approach, the Westernization of Ukraine has two-dimensional damage. Firstly, with the Westernization of Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian ancient Russian civilization and identity will be divided, and the Russians will not be able to solve the identity problem they have been facing since the early 1990s. Secondly, a Westernized Ukraine could be used against the RF if necessary. In Lebow’s conceptualization, this would create a standing problem and mean a loss of status in the international system. For these reasons, to put it in Lebow’s approach, the RF is at war with Ukraine to preserve its spirit motive, status/pride, and impose itself on the other actors in the international system.

In light of Lebow’s perspective, this foreign policy choice of the RF is related to reasons of standing and revenge (in terms of gaining back its lost territories based on “historical justice” discourse). In his study analyzing the RF-Ukraine War in the light of international relations theories, Lebow claims that the main reason for the war in question was spirit. According to Lebow, Putin believes that the USA is determined to weaken the RF.⁸⁹

The RF’s increasing security concerns have led to an inability to balance reason with spirit, which, in turn, has led to the emergence of fear motive and the outbreak of war. In other words, according to the RF, the inability to impose its position on the other actors in the international system (great power status) has led to fear, fear has led to security concerns, and security concerns have led to the use of hard power.

Conclusion

The question “What is the West and why should its values spread?” was answered by Francis Fukuyama two years before the Cold War de jure ended: “Liberalism is good and should spread”. The spread of liberalism in the last years of the Cold War and even in the first decade of the post-Cold War period was almost unproblematic. The newly independent former Soviet republics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which adopted the market economy from 1978 onwards, as well as India and even the RF, which rapidly progressed with shock therapy and Western integration in the post-Cold War period and even had NATO membership on the agenda, practiced liberal principles. In other words, at first glance, the liberal “end” of history seemed imminent.

Fast liberalization adopted in the post-Cold War period did not yield the expected results for the RF, which then politically and economically weakened. Developments such

86 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, *International Organization*, 48:2, Spring 1994, p. 258.

87 Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, p. 127.

88 Andrei A. Sushentshov, “Strategic Foundations of the Ukraine Crisis”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:2, April-June 2022, p. 25.

89 Richard Ned Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War”, *Analyse & Kritik*, 44:1, 2022, p. 128.

as defeat in the First Chechnya War, the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO, the eastward expansion of NATO, and the colorful revolutions caused the RF to reconsider its relations with the West.

Colorful revolutions, Ukraine's EU and NATO membership on the agenda, and the Maidan protests are developments escalating RF's concerns about Ukraine in the post-Cold War period. Within this framework, RF responded to developments regarding Ukraine's integration into the West with hard power. Undoubtedly, RF has also been disturbed by the inclusion of the former Soviet republics of Eastern Europe into NATO and the EU. However, in Putin's words, "Ukraine is different".⁹⁰ The reasons why Ukraine is different can be summarized as follows:

- Ukraine is in the transit geography connecting the RF with Europe.
- Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU will negatively affect the position of the RF in the Black Sea, and the RF will also be surrounded from the south in the Black Sea.
- Ukraine is an essential part of the historic Russian identity.
- Ukraine's entry into Western influence will also mean the defeat of Russia's Eurasianist civilizational discourse.
- If Ukraine joins the Western axis, RF will lose its buffer zone with the West.

In light of the justifications mentioned above, firstly, the RF annexed Crimea in 2014 and recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, where the pro-Russian population was densely populated. Then, it annexed these four regions as a result of the referendums held in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia on September 30, 2022, after the outbreak of the RF-Ukraine War in February 2022. Within the framework of Lebow's approach, reasons for the RF-Ukraine war can be listed as follows:

- One of Lebow's six arguments regarding the causes of war is the aggressiveness of rising powers seeking great power status or those seeking to become hegemons. In the post-Cold War period, RF policymakers frequently argued that the great powers of the international system did not respect the great power status of the RF. RF foreign policy decision-makers, including Putin, emphasized that the great power status of the RF should be respected and Russian interests in the near abroad must not be ignored.
- Revenge, one of the four main causes of war identified by Lebow, generally involves regaining lost territories. Putin's "historical justice" rhetoric, which he often emphasized after the annexation of Crimea, refers to the compensation for giving Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1953 and then to independent Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. This development is one of the factors accelerating the process leading to war in 2022.
- One of the reasons for war that Lebow emphasizes is standing. According to Lebow, who equates standing with a sense of honor, the basic motivation for standing is spirit, and the aim of spirit seeking to achieve through standing is esteem. As Lebow stated in his article about the RF-Ukraine War, the main reason

⁹⁰ Vladimir Putin, "Talks with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev", <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67830>, accessed 17. 05. 2024.

for this war is spirit. Since it lost its great power status in the international system after the USSR, the RF has aimed to regain this status during the Putin era. On the other hand, Putin, in his speech on the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson to the RF, identified RF’s position in the international system by saying, “In 1991, the West thought that Russia would never rise after such shocks and would fall to pieces on its own. This almost happened. We remember the horrible 1990s, hungry, cold, and hopeless. But Russia remained standing, came alive, grew stronger, and occupied its rightful place in the world”. In other words, according to Lebow’s approach, the loss of Ukraine and the expansion of the West through Ukraine is considered an attack on RF’s esteem.

- Lebow identified interest as another cause of war with attacks for wealth and conquest. According to Lebow, although conquest is possible today, the cost of controlling conquered territories is not as low as it used to be. Therefore, states do not usually go to war to gain territory. However, the annexation of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson since 2014 may contradict Lebow’s claim. Yet, Putin’s rhetoric and nature of the annexed territories –they have been described in Russian history as “*Novorossiia*”– suggest that these foreign policy moves are less about conquest and more about standing, enhancing RF’s status and affirming esteem.
- According to Lebow, the fear motive is security-oriented and can only be eliminated by force. It can be argued that the perception of the West in Russian history, the linear relationship between containment and loss of power, was behind the RF’s war against Ukraine. So, Ukraine’s possible NATO and EU membership destabilized the RF’s spirit, and the fear motive centered on security concerns led to the RF attack on Ukraine. In short, reason failed to balance spirit.

As can be understood from the developments and evaluations above, Lebow aims to analyze the causes of war in different dimensions. Therefore, it is possible to explain the historical, contemporary, and psychological dimensions of the causes of the RF-Ukraine War simultaneously through the interdisciplinary approaches of Lebow and similar theorists.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Author Contribution Statements:

The authors contributed to the study equally.

REFERENCES

Published Works

- AKÇAYÖZ Aslı and ŞENGÜL İrem (2018). “Michael Mann: İktidarın Çokluğu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 181-197.
- AKGÜL Öner (2016). “Bilimsel Yöntemlerle Savaşın Nedenlerini Açıklama Yolu Olarak Savaş Çalışmaları Disiplini”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, 12:23, 2016, 1-34.
- BLACK Jeremy (2009). *Savaş ve Dünya: Askeri Güç ve Dünyanın kaderi 1945-2000* (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- BUZAN Barry (2021). “Russia in the Post-Cold War International Order”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 19:4, 22-35.
- CLAUSEWITZ Carl Von (2011). *Savaş Üzerine* (Çev. Selma Koçak), Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul.
- FALK Richard (2007). “War and Peace in and Age of Terror and State Terrorism”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 1-15.
- FREUD Sigmund (2000). *Bir Yanılsamanın Geleceği: Uygarlık ve Hoşnutsuzlukları* (Çev. Aziz Yardımlı), İdea Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- GEORGE Alexandr L. (1969). “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 13:2, 190-222.
- GILPIN Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- GILPIN Robert (2005). *Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politigi* (Çev. Murat Duran, Selçuk Oktay, M. Kadir Ceyhan and Gürkan Polat), Kripto Basım-Yayın, Ankara.
- GÖNLÜBOL Mehmet (1975). *Milletlerarası Siyasi Teşkilatlanma*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara.
- GÖTZ Elias and Jorgen Staun (2022). “Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 43:3, 482-497.
- HARDIE Iain, JOHNSON Dominic and TIERNEY Dominic (2011). “Psychological Aspects of War”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 72-92.
- HERMANN Margaret (2003). “Assesing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis”, Jerrold Post (ed.), *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 178-214.
- HERZ John H. (1950). “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, 2:2, 157-180.
- HOBBS Thomas (2007). *Leviathan veya Bir Din ve Dünya Devletinin İçeriği, Biçimi ve Kudreti* (çev. Semih Lim), Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul.
- HUASHENG Zhao (2022). “The Pendulum of History: Thirty Years after the Soviet Union”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:1, 12-18.
- HUDSON Valerie M. and DAY Benjamin S. (2020). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland.
- ERKUL İbrahim Çağrı (2021). *Birleşik Krallık Dış Politikası 1979-2020*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya.
- ERKUL İbrahim Çağrı (2021). *Commonwealth’i Anlamak: Besikten Mezara Britanya İmparatorluğu*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya.
- JANE Hazar Vural (2019). *Velayeti Fakih ve İran Dış Politikası: Ali Hamaney’in Konumu*, Doktora Tezi, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, İstanbul.
- JANE Murat (2020). *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Trans-Kafkasya Politikasının Analizi: Süreklilik mi Dönüşüm mü?*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa.
- JANE Murat (2022). “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güvenlik Strateji Belgeleri Bağlamında Kırım İlhakı’nın Tarihsel-Sembolik ve Askeri-Jeopolitik Analizi”, *International Journal of Social Inquiry*, 15:2, 415-436.
- KALEOĞLU Burcu (2018). “Charles Tilly: Ulus Devletin Oluşumu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 117-134.
- KASANOV Georgiy V. (2018). “Russia and Ukraine: Forever Apart? Two Countries at Loggerheads over ‘Common Past’”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 16:3, 174-189.
- KAYA Sezgin (2011). *Rus Dış Politikasında Batı*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa.
- KUZIO Taras (2024). “Ukrainian versus Pan-Russian Identities: The Roots of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 1-24.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (1981). *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (1994). “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, *International Organization*, 48:2, 249-277.

- LEBOW Richard Ned (2006). “Fear, interest and honour: Outlines of a theory of International Relations”, *International Affairs*, 82:3, 431-448.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2008). *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2010). “Motives, evidence, identity: Engaging my critics”, *International Theory*, 2:3, 486-494.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2010). *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2012). “The Causes of War: A Reply to My Critics”, *Security Studies*, 21:2, 362-367.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2016). *National Identities and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2022). “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War”, *Analyse & Kritik*, 44:1, 111-135.
- LEBOW, Richard Ned (2010). *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
- LEITES, Nathan (1951). *The Operational Code of Politburo*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- LEITES, Nathan (1953). *A Study of Bolshevism*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.
- LEVY Jack S. (2011). “Theories and causes of war”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 13-33.
- MACKENZIE Megan and WEGNER Nicole (2021). “Introduction to Feminist Solutions for Ending War”, Megan MacKenzie and Nicole Wegner (eds.), *Feminist Solutions for Ending War*, Pluto Press, London, 1-14.
- MOELLENDORF Darrel (1994). “Marxism, Internationalism and the Justice of War”, *Science & Society*, 58:3, 264-286.
- MORGENTHAU Hans J. (1948). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
- ÖZDAL Barış (2020). “1. Dünya Savaşı’nın Diplomasinin Gelişimine Etkileri”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-2*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 1-82.
- ÖZDAL Barış (2022). “Diplomasi”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-1*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 27-96.
- PAZARCI Hüseyin (2004). *Uluslararası Hukuk*, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara.
- SAKWA Richard (2023). “Crisis of the International System and International Politics”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 21:1, 70-91.
- SANDER Oral (2003). *Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918’e*, 2003, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara.
- SANDER Oral (2009). *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara.
- SAPMAZ Ahmet (2018). *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Askeri Güvenlik Refleksindeki Dönüşüm: Askeri Doktrinler, Askeri Müdahaleler, Nedenler*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara.
- STEPHENS Alan and BAKER Nicola (2009). *Savaşın Anlamak: 21. Yüzyıl için Strateji* (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- SUSHENTSHOV Andrei A. (2022). “Strategic Foundations of the Ukraine Crisis”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:2, 24-27.
- SUTYRIN Vyacheslav V. (2022). “Special Military Operation in Ukraine: Consequences for the EAEU and Eurasian Integration”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:2, 158-163.
- ŞAHİN Hakan (2016). “Tarihsel Süreçte Savaşların Devletin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümündeki Rolü”, *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 24, 368-386.
- TESCHKE Benno (2020). “War and International Relations”, Marcello Musto (ed.), *The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 302-319.
- TÜR Özlem and KOYUNCU Çiğdem Aydın (2010). “Feminist Uluslararası İlişkiler Yaklaşımı: Temelleri, Gelişimi, Katkı ve Sorunları”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 7:26, 3-24.
- WALTZ Kenneth (2001). *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- WALZER Michael (2010). *Haklı Savaş Haksız Savaş: Tarihten Örneklerle Desteklenmiş Ahlaki bir Tez* (çev. Mehmet Doğan), Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul.
- YALVAÇ Faruk (2007). “Rousseau’nun Savaş ve Barış Kuramı: Adalet Olarak Barış”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 14:4, 121-160.

- YALVAÇ Faruk (2014), “Savaş ve Barış”, Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 251-285.
- YILMAZ Muzaffer Ercan (2007). “Westphalia’ dan Günümüze Savaş”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 17-38.

Internet Sources

- EREKER Fulya Aksu (2019). “Haklı Savaş”, *Güvenlik Yazıları*, Ekim 2019, https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HakliSavas_FulyaAksuEreker_v.1.pdf, accessed 24. 02. 2024.
- KHLEVNYUK Daria (2023). “The Russian “Old Left,” Conspiracies around the USSR’s Demise, and the Russo–Ukrainian War”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 4 August 2023, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD299.pdf>, accessed 01. 05. 2024.
- PUTIN Vladimir (2021). “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>, accessed 30. 04. 2024.
- PUTIN Vladimir (2022). “Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465>, accessed 17.05.2024.
- PUTIN Vladimir (2022). “Talks with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67830>, accessed 17. 05. 2024.
- “Rusya’ dan bir ilk: Ukrayna’ daki operasyon “savaş” olarak tanımlandı”, <https://www.haberturk.com/rusya-ukrayna-daki-ozel-askeri-operasyon-icin-ilk-defa-savas-kelimesini-kullandi-3671583>, accessed 19. 05. 2024.